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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Coltyne Daniels Conley appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty
plea to aggravated assault. Specifically, Conley contends that the state violated his due process
rights by making a sentencing argument which impliedly disavowed the recommendation it was
bound to present pursuant to the plea agreement. Conley also contends that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion. A review of the record reveals that the state did not breach the
plea agreement and that the district court acted well within its sentencing discretion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After midnight on January 8, 2017, B.H. went to Conley’s residence in Boise. (PSI, p.3. 1)
Conley and the two other individuals who lived at the residence were friends with B.H. (Id.) B.H.
woke Conley up and the two talked and smoked a cigarette together in the garage. (Id.) Both
Conley and B.H. were intoxicated. (Id.) At some point, B.H. went to sleep on the couch. (Id.)
While B.H. fell “in and out of sleep,” Conley placed his penis in B.H.’s mouth, removed her bra,
and had sex with her. (Id.; see also PSI, pp.89-92.) Conley also placed a pillow over B.H.’s face,
making it difficult for her to breathe. (Id.) The next day, B.H. reported the incident to police. (Id.)
In the course of the subsequent investigation, which included a confrontation call between Conley
and B.H. (PSI, pp.94-96), Conley was initially deceitful and changed his story several times (PSI,
p.4, 102-109). During an interview with a law enforcement officer, Conley eventually admitted
that he placed his penis in B.H.’s mouth while she was still unconscious. (PSI, pp.106-107.)
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The PSI, including the attached evaluations and police reports, are contained within the electronic
file, “Conley 45759 psi.pdf.” Citations to page numbers of the “PSI” refer to the page numbers of
this file.
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The state charged Conley with rape, I.C. § 18-6101(5) (rape committed where the victim
was prevented from resistance due to an intoxicating substance) and/or (7) (rape committed where
the victim was asleep and/or unconscious at the time of the act). (R., pp.73-74.) Pursuant to an
agreement with the state, Conley pled guilty to aggravated assault for placing the pillow over
B.H.’s face. (R., pp.77-86; Tr., p.5, L.22 – p.17, L.8.) Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the
state agreed to recommend that Conley be placed on probation if a psychosexual evaluator
concluded that Conley was a low risk to re-offend. (R., p.81; Tr., p.7, Ls.5-6.) In such an instance,
the state would still be permitted to recommend that Conley be ordered to serve jail time, as long
as it recommended that Conley be permitted work release for any portion of an ordered jail term
that exceeded 30 days. (R., p.81; Tr., p.7, Ls.5-12.) A psychosexual evaluator concluded that
Conley “appeared to be at the upper-end of the low risk to re-offend range.” (PSI, p.62.)
At the sentencing hearing, the state asked the district court to follow the plea agreement,
impose an “underlying” unified five-year sentence with three years fixed, and to order Conley to
serve 365 days in jail, the first 30 of which without work release. (Tr., p.36, L.14 – p.46, L.12.)
At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s sentencing argument, Conley’s counsel objected on the
ground that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by impliedly disavowing the sentencing
recommendation range he was bound to present. (Tr., p.46, L.15 – p.47, L.4.) Conley’s counsel
went on to request that the court consider a withheld judgment and impose no additional jail time.
(Tr., p.65, L.16 – p.66, L.2.) The district court overruled Conley’s objection that the prosecutor
breached the plea agreement. (Tr., p.78, L.24 – p.79, L.20.) The court imposed a unified fiveyear sentence with one year fixed but declined to suspend the sentence and place Conley on
probation. (R., pp.96-99; Tr., p.78, Ls.1-9.) The court later denied Conley’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion
for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.100-104.) Conley timely appealed. (R., pp.109-113.)
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ISSUES
Conley states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the state breach the plea agreement by making statements that impliedly
disavow[ed] its promised sentencing recommendation?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence
of five years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Conley, following his guilty
plea to Aggravated Assault?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Conley failed to show that the district court erred by overruling his objection to the
prosecutor’s sentencing argument?

2.

Has Conley failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Conley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Overruling His Objection To The
Prosecutor’s Sentencing Argument
A.

Introduction
Conley contends that the state breached the plea agreement during the sentencing hearing

by impliedly disavowing the sentencing recommendation that it was bound to present.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-13.)

A review of the record reveals no such breach because the

prosecutor’s argument was consistent with the state’s recommendation, and because the prosecutor
was entitled to vigorously argue in favor of this recommendation – particularly considering that it
was substantially different than Conley’s sentencing recommendation. Conley has therefore failed
to demonstrate that the district court erred in overruling his objection to the state’s sentencing
argument.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this

Court de novo, in accordance with contract law standards.” State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106
P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citing United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir.1998)). To
establish that that the state breached a plea agreement and violated a defendant’s due process rights,
however, it is the defendant’s burden to prove both the existence of the plea agreement and the
fact of its breach. State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257, 281 P.3d 90, 94 (2012) (citing State v.
Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010) (and case cited therein)).
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C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Breach The Plea Agreement
“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,

so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595, 226
P.3d at 537. This principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule that,
to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent. State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho
910, 913, 693 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Ct. App. 1985).
The prosecution’s obligation to recommend a sentence promised does not carry with it the
obligation to make the recommendation enthusiastically. State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 300, 92
P.3d 549, 550 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 302, 77 P.3d 988, 991 (Ct. App.
2003). A prosecutor may not circumvent a plea agreement, however, through words or actions
that convey a reservation about a promised recommendation, nor may a prosecutor impliedly
disavow the recommendation as something which the prosecutor no longer supports. Daubs, 140
Idaho at 300, 92 P.3d at 550; Jones, 139 Idaho at 302, 77 P.3d at 991. Although prosecutors need
not use any particular form of expression in recommending an agreed sentence, their overall
conduct must be reasonably consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the
reverse. Jones, 139 Idaho at 302, 77 P.3d at 991. In Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140
(2009), the United States Supreme Court observed that the trial court is ordinarily in the best
position to adjudicate a breach of plea claim “in the first instance.”
In this case, there is no dispute as to the terms of the plea agreement.

After the

psychosexual evaluator concluded that Conley was a low-risk to re-offend, the prosecutor was
bound to recommend that Conley be placed on probation, but was also permitted to recommend
that Conley serve jail time (with work release options for any portion of an ordered jail term that

5

exceeded 30 days). (R., p.81; Tr., p.7, L.1 – p.8, L.14.) Consistent with this agreement, the state
recommended that the court order Conley to serve 365 days in jail, the first 30 without work
release. (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-19.) While not expressly arguing for or referencing probation, the
prosecutor twice expressly asked that the court otherwise follow the plea agreement. (Tr., p.36,
Ls.14-16; p.46, Ls.9-12.) The prosecutor also described the requested five-year unified sentence
as an “underlying” sentence, implying a recommendation of probation.

The district court

overruled Conley’s objection that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in making his
argument. 2 (Tr., p.78, L.24 – p.79, L.11.)
Notably, this was not a case where the parties presented a joint sentencing
recommendation, or a case where the state was bound to recommend the minimum sentence
permitted by law for a particular offense. Instead, consistent with the plea agreement, there was a
substantial difference between the sentence recommended by the state and the sentence
recommended by Conley. The state recommended 365 days in jail (Tr., p.36, Ls.16-19), and
Conley requested a withheld judgment and that he not be required to serve any additional jail time
(Tr., p.65, L.25 – p.66, L.2). The state was entitled to present a vigorous sentencing argument in
an attempt to persuade the court that its recommended sentence was more appropriate than
Conley’s.

2

In overruling Conley’s objection, the district court did not expressly address the specific grounds
for the objection set forth by Conley – that the prosecutor’s sentencing argument impliedly
disavowed the recommendation that he was bound to present. (See Tr., p.78, L.24 – p.79, L.11.)
While it is the appellant’s burden to obtain a ruling on an objection in order to preserve the issue
for appeal, State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377, 387, 883 P.2d 1069, 1079 (1994), the state acknowledges
that Conley preserved this issue by specifically raising the same ground that he now does on
appeal, and by obtaining a ruling from the district court that the state did not breach the plea
agreement.
6

To this end, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor made various arguments and
observations about the PSI, PSE, and the impact of Conley’s crime on B.H. Specifically, portions
of this argument, including those Conley has taken issue with on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.1113) include:
•

Criticizing letters submitted in support of Conley as blaming the victim, and
arguing that the sentiment presented in these letters may have been based upon
untrue versions of the facts as relayed by Conley. (Tr., p.41, Ls.6-13.)

•

Noting Conley’s dishonesty with the presentence investigator in failing to disclose
an arrest that occurred several months after the underlying incident. (Tr., p.41,
Ls.14-17; see also PSI, pp.5, 71-75.)

•

Criticizing the defense litigation strategy and noting its impact on B.H.
Specifically, the prosecutor criticized defense counsel’s pre-sentencing hearing
phone call to B.H.’s brother, in which counsel attempted to elicit information about
B.H.’s sexual proclivities (Tr., p.27, L.10 – p.32, L.1; p.42, Ls.8-12); and counsel’s
decision to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing to attempt to disprove
statements made in B.H.’s impact statement (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-23; p.36, L.22 – p.38,
L.4; p.42, Ls.8-12).

•

Discussing the impact of the crime on B.H. and noting B.H.’s courtroom demeanor.
(Tr., p.44, L.24 – p.46, L.9.)

•

Noting Conley’s inconsistent statements about the underlying criminal incident as
reflected in the PSI, confrontation call between Conley and B.H., and Conley’s
interview with police. (Tr., p.38, L.24 – p.41, L.5.)

•

Referencing portions of the PSI and PSE unfavorable to Conley. (Tr., p.42, L.19 –
p.44, L.23.)

•

Describing conduct that Conley did not ultimately plead guilty to committing. (Tr.,
p.38, L.5 – p.40, L.19.)

The plea agreement did not obligate the state to refrain from making such observations and
arguments. None of the arguments disavowed the state’s recommendation that the court follow
the plea agreement and order that Conley serve 365 days in jail – particularly considering that
Conley, consistently with the agreement, requested that no further jail time be ordered. While the
plea agreement bound the upper limits of the state’s sentencing recommendation, it did not require
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the prosecutor to, as Conley appears to argue on appeal (see Appellant’s brief, p.11), either “give
a single reason why Mr. Conley was an appropriate candidate for probation,” explain “why the
state agreed to recommend probation pursuant to the plea agreement,” “articulate why the state
had offered to resolve this case as an Aggravated Assault,” or mention that “Mr. Conley had no
criminal history prior to this incident.”
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ analysis in State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 164-168, 206
P.3d 867, 870-874 (Ct. App. 2009), is instructive. In that case, Halbesleben, similarly to Conley
(though in the context of a fundamental error analysis), argued that the prosecutor gave the
sentencing recommendation it was bound to present “only as an afterthought,” and that the
prosecutor “effectively renounced the recommendation through vigorous argument against
Halbesleben and the graphic details and implications of her crimes.” Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at
164, 206 P.3d at 870. Halbesleben relied upon several cases, (each of which were also cited by
Conley in his brief (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-13)), in which Idaho appellate courts held that
prosecutors breached plea agreements during sentencing arguments. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at
166-168, 206 P.3d at 872-874. The Idaho Court of Appeals distinguished each of these cases. Id.
In State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 617, 903 P.2d 1305, 1314 (1995), the state was bound
to recommend the minimum sentence that could lawfully be imposed for the crime Lankford was
convicted for. The state made the proper recommendation, but also presented extensive evidence
in aggravation. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that this was fundamentally at-odds with the
state’s obligated position that the court impose the most lenient sentence permitted by law. Id. In
Jones, 139 Idaho at 300-303, 77 P.3d at 989-992, the prosecutor was bound to recommend
probation, but also argued that the presentence investigator advised against probation, and that
when the plea agreement was made, the prosecutor was not aware of all of the relevant aggravating
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information. In State v. Willis, 140 Idaho 773, 774-776, 102 P.3d 380, 381-383 (Ct. App. 2004),
the prosecutor told the court that the state was showing “great restraint” by arguing only the
sentence it was bound to recommend, and that that the defendant should receive the recommended
sentence “at a very minimum.” In Daubs, 140 Idaho at 301, 92 P.3d at 551, the prosecutor
emphasized the sentence recommended in the PSI, which was more severe than the sentence the
prosecutor was bound to recommend.
In Halbesleben, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that in each of these cases, “the
prosecutor acknowledged the recommendation required by the plea agreement but argued various
other reasons why the district court should not accept the recommendation, and instead, impose a
more severe sentence.” Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 168, 206 P.3d at 874. Or, in the case of
Lankford, “the prosecutor presented additional aggravating evidence which, at a sentencing for
first degree murder, only served to favor imposition of the death penalty or fixed life.” Id. The
Court explained that the prosecutor’s argument at Halbesleben’s sentencing hearing was different:
In the present case, the prosecutor made no allusion to a more severe
recommendation contained in the PSI nor gave any personal opinion that
Halbesleben’s crimes merited a greater punishment than what was recommended.
The prosecutor’s vigorous argument did not undermine the sentencing
recommendation but, rather, buttressed it against any argument from defense
counsel that Halbesleben merited even lesser sentences based on mitigating factors.
Therefore, the prosecutor did not impliedly disavow the sentencing
recommendation through her vigorous argument of the facts of Halbesleben’s
crimes and, thus, did not breach the plea agreement.
Halbesleben next contends that, even if the prosecutor’s vigorous argument
served the purpose of rebutting defense counsel’s argument for lesser sentences,
the prosecutor’s argument was “overkill.” She alleges that the argument “far
exceeded anything even remotely necessary to ensure ... a penitentiary sentence
given the circumstances of this case.” Beyond this bare assertion, Halbesleben
provides no other argument or authority for this proposition. Furthermore, we
disagree with Halbesleben’s conclusion. As stated above, defense counsel had
already indicated an intention to seek lesser sentences. When the prosecutor began
her argument, she had to dissuade the district court from any downward deviation
from the recommended sentences in light of defense counsel’s impending
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argument. Her vigorous argument and description of the hard facts of this case and
their impact on the lives of Halbesleben’s children justified her later statement to
the district court that lesser sentences would depreciate the gravity of the crimes
and not serve the necessary goal of protecting society. The prosecutor even argued
this while encouraging the district court to follow the recommendation. As noted
previously, the prosecutor gave no indication of an ulterior motive to seek harsher
sentences and the district court’s discretionary decision to deviate from the
recommendation in favor of harsher penalties does not prove the existence of one.
Therefore, the prosecutor’s vigorous argument detailing the difficult facts of the
case and the effect on the lives of the children did not constitute a breach of the plea
agreement.
Id.
The same is true in the present case. The prosecutor’s sentencing argument, though
vigorous, made no allusion to a more severe sentence than the one that the state was bound to
recommend, nor did the prosecutor present any argument that was fundamentally inconsistent with
this recommendation of probation and jail time.

Thus, the prosecutor’s argument did not

undermine the sentencing argument, but rather, buttressed it against Conley’s argument that a
significantly lesser sentence was appropriate. Therefore, Conley has failed to demonstrate that the
prosecutor breached the plea agreement or that the district court erred in overruling Conley’s
objection to the prosecutor’s sentencing argument.

D.

Any Error Was Harmless
When there has been a contemporaneous objection to an alleged breach of a plea

agreement, the appellate court determines first if the plea agreement was breached. See State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). If the court concludes that there was a
breach, it next determines whether the breach was harmless. See id. Where a breach is shown,
the test for harmless error is whether the appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the sentence imposed would have been the same absent the breach. See id.; see also Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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In this case, a review of the record, and particularly of the district court’s comments at the
sentencing hearing, reveal, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the court would have imposed the same
sentence regardless of any breach. The court expressly stated that the prosecutor’s arguments
regarding the defense litigation strategy, and the state’s ultimate recommendation that Conley
serve 365 days in jail, had no bearing on its sentencing determination. (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-11; p.69,
L.25 – p.71, L.7; p.79, L.12 – p.80, L.1.) Further, the court stated its disagreement with any
implication by the state that any of these activities constituted harassment by Conley towards B.H.
(Tr., p.70, L.23 – p.71, L.7.) The district court instead focused its sentencing analysis on the facts
underlying the original criminal charge of rape, as relayed by Conley’s own statements to
authorities; 3 the act to which Conley ultimately pled guilty, placing a pillow over B.H.’s face; and
the victim impact statement. (Tr., p.71, L.13 – p.77, L.9.) Because, in making its sentencing
determination, the district court relied primarily on the facts of the underlying case as made
available to it through the record, rather than the prosecutor’s argument, it is clear that the court
would have imposed the same sentence regardless of any breach of the plea agreement. Any error
was therefore harmless.

II.
Conley Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Conley contends that the unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, imposed upon

his guilty plea to aggravated assault is excessive in light of mitigating factors. (Appellant’s brief,

3

As the district court noted, the law permitted it to consider these facts. (Tr., p.71, L.13 – p.73,
L.6. (citing State v. Ott, 102 Idaho 169, 627 P.2d 798 (1981); State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 800, 133
Idaho 800 (Ct. App. 1999).) Further, the court specifically informed Conley, at the change of plea
hearing, that it would do so. (Tr., p.16, Ls.11-21.)
11

pp.13-14.) The record, however, supports the sentence imposed, and demonstrates that the district
court appropriately considered relevant mitigating factors in making its sentencing determination.
Conley has therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Anderson, 131

Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144
(1994)).

C.

Conley Has Failed To Show That His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any Reasonable View
Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish that the

sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001)
(citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, Conley must
show that his sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at
577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of
protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the
whole sentence on appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant’s probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391
(2007). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable
sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707,
710 (Ct. App. 1982).
In making its sentencing determination in this case, the district court reviewed the PSI and
PSE, and was aware of the appropriate sentencing objectives. (Tr., p.69, Ls.14-22.) The court
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expressly noted that it had considered the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-2521 for determining
whether a defendant should be placed on probation or sentenced to a term of incarceration. (Tr.,
p.77, Ls.18-25.) The court also indicated that it had considered the relevant mitigating factors –
Conley’s limited criminal history, strong support system, and psychosexual evaluator conclusion
that he was a low risk to re-offend. (Tr., p.75, L.19 – p.76, L.10.)
The district court ultimately concluded that imposition of a one-year fixed sentence for
aggravated assault was appropriate in light of the facts underlying the original charge, the facts
pertaining to the charge Conley pled guilty to, and the impact of Conley’s actions on B.H. The
state summarized these facts above. (See supra, pp.1, 8-9; see also PSI, pp.244-246 (victim impact
statement).) Additionally, as the prosecutor discussed at the sentencing hearing (Tr., p.42, L.19 –
p.44, L.23), while the pscyhosexual evaluator concluded that Conley was at “the upper-end of the
low-risk to re-offend range,” the evaluation revealed more concerning factors as well.
Specifically, the PSE included indications that Conley minimized his actions and claimed a belief
that B.H. was consenting at the time of his acts; the MMPI II test indicated that Conley is motivated
by self-interest, fear of being caught in dishonest behavior, and that he acts based on selfish
motives; the PAI test indicated that Conley was defensive, tried to exaggerate certain problems,
and may have a personality disorder; the MSI-II test indicated that Conley had thinking errors and
does not accept full responsibility for his actions; and the Stable-2007 test concluded that Conley
was a “moderate” risk to re-offend (PSI, pp.25-65).
Based on the nature of the offense, Conley’s character, the impact of the crime on B.H.,
and the objectives of sentencing, a unified sentence of five years with one year fixed is not
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts of this case. Conley has therefore failed to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Conley’s sentence.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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